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“It is only a matter of time before reports emerge again from somewhere of massacres, 
mass starvation, rape, and ethnic cleansing. And then the question will arise again in 
the Security Council, in political capitals, and in the media: 
‘What do we do?’ 
This time around the international community must have the answers.” 
 
Evans & Sahnoun, 2002: 100 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis is inspired by the will to understand why the international community stands by while 
mass atrocities are committed by the Syrian government. My research question ‘Why does the 
international community not intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Syria?’ forms the premise for 
this thesis. My main argument is that because of the non-consensus within the international 
community about R2P as a norm, there is a lack of political will to intervene in the situation in Syria. 
Furthermore, I argue that this lack of consensus is caused by the protection of the national interests 
of the states involved, especially the security of their sovereignty. These arguments are substantiated 
by the acceptance of my hypotheses which are based on the core assumptions of realism, liberalism, 
and constructivism. These hypotheses show that the protection of sovereignty, the lack of a common 
interest, and the non-consensus about R2P are crucial aspects in the decision not to intervene in the 
humanitarian crisis in Syria.   
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Introduction 
 
During the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1999, former Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stresses out the need for the international community to 
change the attitude towards humanitarian crises. He referred  to the lack of action during the 
humanitarian crisis in Rwanda in 1994, where afterwards the international community has been 
accused of “doing too little, too late” (Annan, 1999: 49). Also the way in which the international 
community has responded to the crises in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999, are examples which 
Annan has used to show that there is a need for a sort of intervention model that satisfies the needs of 
the new millennium. He argues that these examples have shown the world that the international 
community cannot stand by and watch while gross and systematic violations of human rights are 
taking place. He also emphasizes on the fact that intervention must be based on legitimate and 
universal principles, if the international community wants to keep the sustained support of the 
world’s people (Annan, 1999: 49). “We need to adapt our international system better to a world with 
new actors, new responsibilities, and new possibilities for peace and progress.” (Annan, 1999: 49). 
In addition, Annan (1999:49) states that to avoid that history repeats itself “it is essential that the 
international community reach consensus, not only on the principle that massive and systematic 
violations of human rights must be checked, wherever they take place, but also on the ways of 
deciding what action is necessary, and when, and by whom.”  
With these thoughts in mind, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) was established in September 2000. This commission had the task to deal with 
the legal, moral, operational, and political questions within the debate about humanitarian 
intervention. The result of this commission is a report under the name of ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect’ (R2P), which provides a framework for how to deal with human protection in other states. 
R2P contains the idea that “sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are 
unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of 
states.”(ICISS, 2001a: VIII).      
In March 2011, R2P came into practice for the first time, responding on the humanitarian 
crisis in Libya. In addition to R2P, Resolution 1973 of the Security Council authorized quick, robust, 
and effective international action for the protection of the people of Libya from the harm that 
Muammar el-Qaddafi has brought on his unarmed civilians. This Resolution 1973 authorized “all 
necessary measures” against Libya (Weiss, 2011: 289). After a ‘successful’ intervention, R2P  
seemed to shine a bright light on the complexity which humanitarian intervention brings along. But 
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within a short period the glory of R2P became overshadowed by the crisis in Syria. At the beginning 
of the crisis, there was still a little bit of hope for R2P to fit the case, but now two years later, the 
crisis is still ongoing. Cruelties in Syria are still dominating the news, and again the international 
community is late in coming. An immediate question that comes up is ‘why do we not take any 
action in this case?’. Marietje Schaake, Dutch member of the European Parliament for D66/ALDE 
Group, ask this same question last January at the European Parliament in Strasbourg (Youtube, 
Marietje Schaake, 2013).  It is very interesting to see how the international community deals with 
each case differently, but it is unclear how the international community determines whether or not to 
intervene in a humanitarian crisis. It is obvious that R2P cannot be used as some kind of blueprint for 
each humanitarian crisis. There seems to be some sort of ‘error’ in the framework that makes this 
framework not the rule but the exception as a solution how to deal with a humanitarian crisis.  
This research will deal with the question why the international community does not intervene 
in every country where the people are so obviously suffering from the harm of their own government. 
To narrow down the focus, this thesis will concentrate on the crisis in Syria. The research question 
for this thesis will therefore be: 
 
‘Why does the international community not intervene in  
the humanitarian crisis in Syria?’ 
 
The main argument I will make is that because of the non-consensus within the international 
community about R2P as a norm, there is a lack of political will to intervene in the situation in Syria. 
Furthermore, I argue that this lack of consensus is caused by the protection of the national interests 
of the states involved, especially the security of their sovereignty. This argument will be 
substantiated by the analysis of the framework of R2P by three IR theories, namely realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism. This analysis will show that R2P is only useful if the international 
community has reach a consensus about R2P as a new international norm. The case of Syria will 
show us that the interests involved are complex and the lessons of Libya have an impact on the idea 
of R2P.   
 The relevance of this thesis is that it tries to blend in the current discussion about why the 
international community has still not intervene in the humanitarian conflict in Syria. Although this 
thesis has the focus on the case of Syria, it tries to give an insight in the dilemmas surrounding 
humanitarian interventions. It tries to show the complexity of national and international interests that 
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are involved in the process of the discussion-making whether or not to intervene in a particular 
humanitarian crisis.  
 The structure of this thesis is as follows: First, I will provide an outline of several authors 
who have written about humanitarian intervention, with the focus on the framework of R2P. With 
this literature review I hope to get a clear view of the development which R2P has passed. If we want 
to find the answer to the question ‘why R2P is not the answer to all humanitarian crises’, we have to 
grub in the development of humanitarian intervention after the Cold War period. It is this literature 
review that provides the basis for the following research part of the thesis. The chapter ‘research 
design’ follows after the literature review. Here, I will first clarify the theoretical framework of this 
thesis. This framework consists of three International Relations (IR) theories, namely realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism. I will use these IR theories to search for the ‘error’ in R2P. 
Furthermore, the research design will provide the method of analysis, the way in which I have 
selected the case for the thesis, the important concepts and definitions used in my research, the 
variables, and very important my hypotheses for this thesis. At last, the research design will mention 
the scope and limitations of this thesis. After this theoretical framework, I will dedicate a chapter to 
the interests which are involved in the case of Syria. It is impossible to hunt down all interests 
involved but I have tried to give a clear picture of the interests of the states which have been, and are 
still influencing the way in which the Syrian crisis is heading. In the next chapter, I will give a 
description of the framework of R2P and why it cannot fulfill its expected role as an solution to the 
Syrian crisis. In the conclusion I will accept or reject the hypotheses I have mentioned in my research 
design and will close with the conclusion that R2P has a long way to go before it can fulfill its 
purpose of being the answer in how to react to humanitarian crises.  
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Chapter 1  
Literature review 
 
Humanitarian intervention is a controversial issue in international politics. It is controversial because 
it includes two subjects that are sensitive matters within the international community; sovereignty 
and humanity (Evans, 2008). Debates relating to humanitarian intervention have gathered a lot of 
attention worldwide and find themselves stuck between the traditional way of thinking about 
intervention, the normative way of thinking about humanity and responsibility, and the reality of 
international affairs. 
In their article ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’, Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith (1998) 
call the debate on humanitarian intervention “unsatisfactory”. They argue that the people who are 
involved in this debate are talking past each other and that most of the discussions they have are 
lacking the ethical concepts. In their article they specifically refer to the absence of the ‘Just War’ 
tradition. According to Fixdal and Smith (1998) this tradition is the important ethical concept that is 
missing in the debate about humanitarian intervention. They argue that the ‘Just War’ tradition can 
contribute in discussing and evaluating this controversial object, especially in the analysis of the use 
of armed forces (1998: 283). The tradition provides criteria for the justice of resort to war, ‘Jus ad 
Bellum’, and the justice of the conduct of war, ‘Jus in Bello’.  
The old debate about humanitarian intervention, which must be seen against the background 
of the Cold War period, was mostly about the motivation and about sovereignty. The new debate in 
which humanitarian intervention is being discussed, is about responsibility and the proper use of 
armed forces. This debate responds to the needs of the post-Cold War era (Fixdal&Smith, 1998).  
 In 1999, during the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly, the former 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, gave his thoughts on how the international 
community should act in times of humanitarian crises. His thoughts were inter alia, based on the 
tragedies of Rwanda in 1994, Kosovo in 1999, and in that same year the crisis in East Timor. Annan 
(1999: 49) stresses out the need for change in the international attitude towards humanitarian crises. 
For the next century, the international community should intervene in time “when death and 
suffering are being inflicted on large numbers of people, and when the state nominally in charge is 
unable or unwilling to stop it.”(Annan, 1999: 49). With this in mind, the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) came up with a report called ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect’ (R2P) in December 2001. This report provides a framework which deals with the 
controversial aspect of humanitarian intervention, and use the concept of the ‘responsibility to 
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protect’ instead of the ‘right to intervene (ICISS, 2001: 17). Amitav Acharya (2002), Thomas Weiss 
(2007), and Alex Bellamy (2011) are three of many scholars who argue that the main contribution to 
the debate of humanitarian intervention lies in the fact that R2P redefines the concept in this manner. 
Also the concept of ‘protection’ extends to a broader meaning than intervention. Furthermore, the 
R2P framework covers inter alia, the criteria of the ‘Just War’ tradition to which Fixdal and Smith 
(1998) refer as the missing aspect in the debate about humanitarian intervention. Now the debate 
about humanitarian intervention is not any longer about ‘whether’ to react, but it is more about ‘how’ 
to react (Bellamy, 2011:265).  
 Another important aspect in the discussion about intervention on humanitarian grounds is still 
the concept of sovereignty. R2P also deals with this concept. Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun 
(2002: 102), who were the Co-Chairs of the ICISS, discuss the concept of sovereignty in their article 
‘The Responsibility to Protect’ and emphasize on the fact that sovereignty implies a dual 
responsibility. This means that at the one hand, externally a state has to respect the sovereignty of 
another state, but at the other hand, internally a state has to respect the basic rights and dignity of all 
the people within the state. Evans and Sahnoun (2002: 102) stress out that “sovereignty as 
responsibility has become the minimum content of good international citizenship”.  
 Next to the contribution of the principles of the ‘Just War’ tradition, and the change of the use 
of concept, the ‘responsibility to protect’ instead of  the ‘right to intervene’, in the discussion about 
humanitarian intervention, Evans and Sahnoun (2002) argue that if the international community 
wants to gain more support and understanding for humanitarian intervention then it is necessary to 
add the concepts of the ‘responsibility to prevent’ and the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ to R2P. If these 
two concepts are integrated in the discussion, the concept of the ‘responsibility to react’ will have a 
better foundation and will be more supported (2002: 102). In this sense, R2P implies a duty to react 
in humanitarian crises. Acharya (2002: 373) argues, in his work ‘Redefining the dilemmas of 
humanitarian intervention’, that the report on R2P “deserves the attention of anyone interested in 
promoting multilateral approaches to global peace”. Evans and Sahnoun (2002: 110) see R2P as an 
emerging international norm but acknowledge the frequent lack of political will. For R2P to succeed, 
there must be consensus about the idea.  
Noha Shawki (2011) dedicates her article ‘Responsibility to Protect: The Evolution of an 
International Norm’ to describe the development of R2P as a norm, and the acceptance of that norm 
by the international community. She uses the ‘Norm Lifecycle Model’ from the constructivists 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink to determine in which status of acceptance R2P is situated. 
Shawki (2011) argues that the endorsement of the World Summit in September 2005 could be seen 
as the ‘tipping point’ for R2P. A stage, which Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) describe as the norm 
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being adopted by a critical mass of states as the new norm in international relations. After this point 
the norm usually spreads fast among the remaining states. At this stage, the norm is accepted but is  
not yet taken for granted (Shawki, 2011: 175). But Shawki (2011: 183) argues differently, and 
indicates a number of crucial points which show that R2P have not yet achieved the stage of ‘tipping 
point’.  The roundtable consultations in several countries, the promotion of the implementation of 
R2P, the meetings for the NGO’s which should have to strengthen the normative consensus for R2P, 
and the further understanding of the norm, show us that R2P has not yet reach the ‘tipping point’ but 
is still at the stage of refining the R2P principles, defining the application of the principles, and 
starting to socialize states into applying those principles. Shawki (2011) also argues that there are 
some problems for the future of R2P. The endorsement of R2P at the World Summit in 2005 differs 
from the concept that has been established by the ICISS in 2001. This can provide  confusion in how 
and when R2P should be applied. If there is not a clear shared understanding of R2P then every state 
can have its own interpretation of it, which can cause troubles during the decision-making process 
about an intervention. Thierry Tardy (2012: 448) argues that the international acceptance of R2P will 
be a slow process due to the regions of the world where the concept of sovereignty is seen as the holy 
grail. The concept of sovereignty as a dual responsibility can be received as suspicious. If this is the 
case, then those particular states can offer resistance against the norm of R2P. According to Tardy 
(2012), the report on R2P is linking the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ with the ‘civilian 
protection in peacekeeping operations’ when it is talking about the ‘responsibility to rebuild’. Tardy 
(2012) argues that by linking these two concepts the effects of both norms will be counterproductive. 
Both norms have consequences for the sovereignty of a state, which will lead to resistance in 
accepting R2P as a norm. The fear is that R2P will be misused by the ‘great powers’ in pursuing their 
hidden agendas. According to Tardy (2012: 448), “because the disadvantages of linking the two 
norms are greater than the expected benefits, decoupling the two terms is the way forward.” So the 
overall consensus about R2P, which should make the norm a success, is still not achieved.  
Before the establishment of the ICISS and the creation of R2P, Fixdal and Smith (1998) 
argued that the debate about humanitarian intervention was “unsatisfactory”. Without the ‘Just War’ 
tradition, which could especially contribute in the discussion and evaluation about the use of armed 
forces, the discussions would lack an important ethical concept, according to Fixdal and Smith (1998: 
283). A few years later, the ICISS created a report which would provide a new international norm 
that should change the attitude towards intervention based on humanitarian grounds. The report used 
the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ instead of the ‘right to intervene’, and gave the concept 
of ‘sovereignty’ another meaning by approaching it as a dual responsibility (Evans&Sahnoun, 2002). 
The report also adds the concepts of ‘responsibility to prevent’ and the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ to 
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ensure that the ‘responsibility to react’ would receive support among states who are indifferent about 
the idea of the ‘responsibility to react’. The framework that outlines R2P includes the principles of 
the ‘Just War’ tradition. This implies that the debate about humanitarian intervention should ‘satisfy’ 
the requirement that Fixdal and Smith (1998) set. But the debate about humanitarian intervention has 
still not yet reach the point to where there is a consensus about how to deal with this controversial 
issue. The contribution of the ‘Just War’ tradition in the R2P framework, next to the fact of the 
changing concepts to make R2P more acceptable, did not help to reach an overall consensus, 
according to Shawki (2011) and Tardy (2012). They argue that the norm of R2P is not at all accepted 
by the international community, and that there is in no case an overall consensus. Shawki (2011) 
argues that the endorsement of R2P at the World Summit differs from the concept of R2P by the 
ICISS, which can lead to difficulties for R2P in the future. Tardy (2012) argues that R2P is linked to 
the concept of the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations, which have a great effect on the 
sovereignty of a state. This fact can lead to resistance in accepting R2P as a norm. Therefor, R2P 
cannot be a successful instrument in dealing with humanitarian crises.    
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Chapter 2  
Research design 
 Theoretical framework 
Considering the research question, and with in mind the broader view of (future) other cases of non-
intervention, I will use the IR theories to find out why R2P cannot fit the humanitarian crisis in Syria. 
In searching for this answer, I hope that I can also discover some sort of pattern which can be used to 
explain non-intervention in general.  
 The reason why I have chosen to test R2P by the use of IR theories, is because these theories 
deal with the issues of war and peace, and conflict and cooperation. These theories analyzes the state 
system (Jackson&Sørensen,2007: 9). There are different currents within the IR theories, with each a 
different point of view on the issue of humanitarian intervention. For this research I have chosen for 
realism and liberalism because these two currents have been at the start of the IR studies and 
developed over time. I have chosen constructivism as a third current because it is a more recent 
theory within the study of IR. Constructivism approaches humanitarian intervention from a whole 
different perspective than realism and liberalism do. With these three different IR theories I hope to 
get a complete picture of what is necessary to decide whether or not to proceed an intervention, and 
what is lacking, or in other words ‘why is R2P not the answer to Syria?’.  
 At this time in the crisis of Syria it is obvious that R2P does not fit the case. However, I have 
integrated it in my research design, because the R2P framework has been established to prevent that 
history would repeat itself, and the international community would not stand aside while gross and 
systematic violations of human rights would take place (Annan, 1999: 49). I will describe the three 
IR theories in this theoretical framework. 
 
Realism 
Within the realist IR theory there is an important distinction between classical realism and neo-
realism. The first is one of the ‘traditional’ approaches to IR and is mostly normative in approach. 
The focus here is on national security and state survival. Neo-realism however, is a more recent 
doctrine and is mostly scientific in approach. Here the focus is on the international system or 
structure (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 61).  
 While there is a distinction between the two approaches, realism in general has a couple basic 
ideas and a core assumption. The core assumption is that world politics operates in an international 
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system of anarchy. This does not mean that there is an overall chaos but that there is no high 
authority that is like an umbrella over all states; functioning as some sort of world government. It is 
the relation of states which is important in the international relations.  
 The state takes a central position in realism. All other actors, like NGO’s etcetera, are not or 
at least less important within the realist theory. It must be mentioned that states are not equal within 
realism. Realism considers states in the context of power; states are hierarchically ordered based on 
their power. Therefore, the struggle for domination and security by the great powers, is what 
international relations is about. According to this basic assumption, the normative core is national 
security and state survival. The basic ideas of realism, that fit this normative core and the basic 
assumption, have their origins in the Ancient Greek period, by the Greek historian Thucydides, and 
have been developing through important historical philosophers like Machiavelli and Hobbes. They 
all had a pessimistic view of human nature. Humans are always self-interested and in competition 
with others for their own well-being. Furthermore, classical realists see international relations 
necessarily in conflict ways, and that war is the only solution to resolve these international conflicts. 
According to this theory, the normative core values of national security and state survival are highly 
ranked. Finally, all realists are skeptical about the comparability of progress in international relations 
with that of progress in domestic political life (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 60). These ideas are still 
the core of the realist perspective nowadays.  
 One of the most influential neo-realists of the twentieth century is Hans J. Morgenthau. His 
core assumption about international relations is that “ politics is a struggle for power over men, and 
whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, 
maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action.” (Morgenthau, 1965: 
195). He formulates his IR theory in six principles. His first principle is that same pessimistic view 
of human nature like the classical realists have. The fundaments of politics are set in a permanent and 
unchanging human nature, which is egocentric and egoistic. His second principle is that politics 
cannot be limited to economics or morals like Marxists or Liberals argue, because “Politics is an 
autonomous sphere of action”. (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 70). According to Morgenthau, state 
leaders must act in accordance to the political principles. The third principle of Morgenthau is that, 
because human nature is self-interested in maximizing their security and survival, these interests will 
come into conflict within the arena of politics. His fourth principle is about the distinction between 
political and private morality. The state leader has more responsibility than the private man. He is 
responsible for his people, for their security and their welfare. In that sense, the state leader must not 
try to do the best thing, but do the best according to the circumstances of that time. Following this 
principle, the fifth principle of Morgenthau is that nations cannot oppose their ideology on other 
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nations. His sixth and last principle about IR theory is again based on the pessimistic view of human 
nature. People are not the people we wish them to be. People are not perfect and have their 
limitations (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 70).  
 Another influential neo-realist is Kenneth Waltz. His perspective is based on some classical 
realist ideas but he ignores the normative concerns involved. He tries to provide a scientific approach 
to the international political system. The focus of his neo-realism is on the structure of the political 
system. He focuses particularly on the relative distribution of power within the international system. 
Here, actors are not that important as in classic realism because the structures will direct them to act 
in a certain way. Waltz sees all states performing the same tasks and are in that way similar. The 
differences between states lie in the fact that states have different capabilities. This means that the 
international arena changes when great powers are shifting and in that case also the balance of power. 
In this anarchical system the danger of war is always lurking. In this international arena Waltz  
distinguishes two systems. A bipolar system, which is according to Waltz more stable and provides 
more certainty for peace and security than the second system he distinguishes, the multipolar system. 
He argues that “With only two great powers, both can be expected to act to maintain the system.” 
(Waltz, 1979: 204). What departs Waltz from classic realism and from Morgenthau, besides his 
scientific approach, is that he does not discuss the human nature. His only focus is on the structure of 
the international political system and not on the nature of the humans who create and operate in this 
system (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 77). In this sense, foreign policy is dependent of the structure of 
the system. State leaders have to act within this given structure. This means that state leaders have 
not much to choose from within the system. It is all determined by the structure in which they must 
operate. This principle shows a major difference between classical realism and Waltz neo-realism. 
Classical realism and the neo-realism of Morgenthau show the importance of politics and ethics of 
statecraft but the neo-realism theory of Waltz shows that the individual state leader is tied by the 
structure and have no influence in policy at all.  
 So based on the classical realists and the more recent neo-realists approaches the overall 
assumption is that the world operates in an anarchic international system. The state takes a central 
position within realism and it is the relation of states which is important in international relations. In 
this relation, states are not equal but are hierarchically ordered based on their power. It is in this 
context of power that realism sees states, and their struggle for domination. Based on this assumption, 
the core of realism is national security and state survival. The difference between classical realism 
and neo-realism is the focus and their perspective of international relations. As noted above, realism 
focuses on the state while neo-realism focuses on the structure of the political system and argues that 
these structure direct states in a certain way. It implies that state leaders have no influence by 
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themselves because they are tied by the structure of the international system (Jackson&Sørensen, 
2007; Waltz, 1979).   
Liberalism 
One of the most famous liberals with a public position is probably Woodrow Wilson. His vision to 
transform international relations from ‘a jungle of chaotic power politics to a zoo of regulated and 
peaceful intercourse’ touch the core of liberalism. Liberalism believes in cooperation within 
international relations. The central concern of liberals is the happiness and satisfaction of the 
individual. Within liberalism there are a couple basic assumptions. The first assumption is the 
positive view of human nature. Although liberals do recognize the self-interests and competitive 
characteristics of humans, they believe that humans have common interests and therefore are willing 
to cooperate in domestic affairs as well as international affairs. This cooperation will lead to greater 
benefits for all (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 97-99). 
 The emergence of liberalism is closely related to the emergence of the modern liberal state. 
Liberal philosophers like Locke and Bentham have set the basis for the liberal belief in progress, 
which is the second basic assumption of liberalism. This progress always implies progress for 
individuals. Locke and Bentham assumed that the modern liberal state is based on a political and 
economical system that will provide prospects of great wealth. Following from the first assumption, 
humans are willing to work together and overcome their fear and lust for power. Therefore, they see 
international relations as cooperative instead of conflicting. Liberals perspective on conflict and war 
is that it is not inevitable (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 97-99). 
Within liberalism there are different trends. Sociological liberalism is one of them. It 
acknowledge the fact that IR does not only studies the relation between national governments but 
also the relation between individuals, groups, and societies. They believe that people are dependent 
of each other and that these interdependent relations are more cooperative than the relations that 
states have. Here, their argument is that states are exclusive and that states do not have overlapping 
interests. The sociological liberalist Rosenau (1992) believes that if the world develops large 
amounts of transnational networks, the world will be a more peaceful one. These interdependence 
relations are being increased by the high division of labour in the international economy, according 
to interdependence liberalists like Rosecrance (1986). This development should discourage possible 
conflicts between states. Keohane and Nye (1977) argue that after the Cold War period the 
interdependence relationships between states have changed. During the Cold War, ‘high politics’ of 
security had priority over ‘low politics’ of economics and social affairs. Nowadays, the relation 
between states is not only based on state leaders but also – and even more so – on different levels and 
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actors, like economics and banks, technology and (social) media. There is also an amount of 
individuals with transnational relations outside the state. Keohane and Nye (1977) also argue that 
because of all these transnational relationships, the use of military force is less effective under the 
circumstances of interdependence.   
Another trend of liberalism is institutional liberalism. The ideas of Woodrow Wilson about a 
League of Nations is probably the best example to get an understanding of institutional liberalism. 
Nowadays, the NATO and the EU are recent examples of how institutional liberalism sees 
international institutions, and these institutions show that international cooperation can be possible. 
International institutions are not only tangible organizations but also a set of rules that determine 
how states have to act or react in particular situations and areas. Examples of these set of rules are 
rules about shipping or trade. This belief shows the claim of institutional liberalists that the 
promotion of cooperation between states is realized through international institutions. Institutions 
limit the fear of states and the lack of trust between states that lies at the basis of an anarchic 
international system  (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007:108-110).  
Going further on this idea, structural liberalists like Deudney and Ikenberry (1999), describe 
the relations between Western liberal democracies. They find five elements which are, according to 
them, the principles of the Western order. The first one is ‘security co-binding’. This element 
includes the idea that states are locking each other into mutually constraining institutions. Institutions 
like NATO is here an example of. The second element is ‘penetrated reciprocal hegemony’. The US 
has been the leading force of the Western order but is also susceptible to pressure from its allies. 
Next to the US as hegemony, are the great powers like Germany and Japan. They have the status of 
‘semi-sovereign and partial great power’, which is the third element in the Western world order of 
Deudney and Ikenberry (1999). Their acquisition of nuclear weapons play an important part in 
obtaining this status. The fourth element is the ‘economic openness’ of the Western liberal order. 
Only through cooperation, the optimal results can be achieved. Finally, the fifth element in this 
theory of structural liberalism is the ‘civic identity’ which refers to the common Western support for 
political values, civil liberties, ethnic toleration, and market economies (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 
123-125). 
Based on all these different currents within liberalism, the basic belief liberals have is in 
cooperation within international relations. The main purpose of liberalism is welfare instead of 
security. Liberalism believes in the common interests of human beings and that they are therefore 
willing to cooperate in domestic affairs, as well as in international affairs because this will lead to 
greater benefits for all. In this way they differ themselves from realism because they believe in 
cooperation instead of conflict. Examples of the European Union and the United Nations show that 
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international cooperation is possible. International institutions promote cooperation between states 
which reduces the lack of trust between states (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007). 
 
Constructivism 
During the Cold War the world was divided in two blocs of great powers facing each other. This 
bipolar system determined the thoughts about international relations. After the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War, the international world became more open. This opened the door 
for constructivism to come up with ideas about anarchy and power, different from the dominant 
claims of realism and liberalism. According to constructivists actors are to be formed by thinking 
about them, and act and react to these structures in different and new ways. This idea implies that 
there is a more dynamic relation between structures and actors that is less rigid than is assumed. In 
this way their perspective of anarchy is less rigid than the perspective of realism about the 
international anarchic world. Because literature in the US was dominated by the theories of realism 
and liberalism during the Cold War, the US had the most fertile ground for the theory of 
constructivism (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 163).  
 The focus of constructivists is on the human consciousness and its place in international 
affairs. The main argument of constructivism is that the social aspect of international relations is the 
most important one. Behind constructivism lies the philosophy that the social world is not something 
that is out there and objective, it is not a given but it depends on the thoughts and ideas of the people 
who are involved in it. Constructivism argues that the study of international relations has to put its 
focus on the ideas and the beliefs which allow the actors within the international area to be informed, 
and that it must also focus on the shared understandings between those actors. The international 
system does not exist on its own according to constructivists. The international system is formed by 
ideas. It is created by humans and consists of a set of norms which are idealistic by nature and are 
constituted at a particular time and place, by certain people. Everything that is brought in the social 
world is made by men. According to constructivists this social world is an intersubjective domain. It 
has meaning to the people who live in it and who have created it. The ideas and the understandings 
of these ideas, are important. In this way populations and territories are receiving their meanings. 
Following these assumptions about the international system, constructivists argue that the 
international system will change if these ideas and beliefs are changing (Jackson&Sørensen, 
2007:162).  
 Alexander Wendt (1992) expresses this idea with the words: “anarchy is what states make of 
it.” Wendt’s main argument is that he rejects the assumption that anarchy necessarily leads to self-
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help. Whether or not this would occur, depends on the interaction between states. He argues that 
during this process the states’ identities and interests are being created. He recognizes that the 
interaction between states take place in a system that is characterized by anarchy, but in contrast with 
the realist view this does not lead to self-help (Wendt, 1999). “Social interaction between states can 
also lead to more benign and friendly cultures of anarchy.” (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 169). Indeed, 
ideas can and do create material power and state interest. States are in the possession of military 
capabilities, but this does not directly implies that this will lead to enmity and arms races.  
 Martha Finnemore is another influential constructivist. She also defines the states’ identities 
and interests but her focus is on the norms of the international society, instead of looking at the 
interaction between states. See looks at the way in which the norms of the international society affect 
the state identity and its interests. According to Finnemore (1996), the behavior of a state is defined 
by their identity and interest, which in turn is defined by international forces. These international 
forces are the norms of behavior that are rooted in the international society and find passage through 
international organizations who transmit these norms to states. In this way, these norms create 
national policies (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 169).  Together with Wendt, Finnemore emphasizes that 
the international environment is the most important factor that shapes a states’ identity. Together 
with Kathryn Sikkink, Finnemore has developed a theory about the stages of norm acceptance. This 
so called ‘Norm Lyfecycle Model’ is made up in three phases. The first one is ‘norm emerges’, 
where norm entrepreneurs introduce the norm and will try to get the new norm endorsed by a critical 
mass of countries. If this new norm is endorsed by these countries, the norm has reach its ‘tipping 
point’ which will lead to the stage of ‘norm cascade’. In this stage, the norm will spread rapidly 
among the remaining countries. The ‘tipping point’ and the ‘norm cascade’ usually take place after 
the norm is institutionalized within the process and procedures of the international community. The 
last stage is the ‘norm internalization’, which means that the norm is taken for granted by the 
members of the international community. At this stage, the norm does not have any resistance at all 
(Shawki, 2011: 175). 
 To summarize, the core assumptions of constructivism is that the social world is not a given, 
it depends on the thoughts and ideas of the people who are involved in it. Their perspective on 
international relations expresses itself in their idea that the international system is formed by ideas. It 
is created by men and consists of a set of norms which have meanings to the people who created it 
and who are living in this system. The understanding of the ideas is crucial because the ideas directs 
the system and the people within.   
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Method of Analysis 
This thesis will be based on a literary research. The focus of this research is on the case of Syria and 
the reasons why there has not been an intervention two years after the outbreak of the humanitarian 
crisis, while in December 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
came up with a report and a framework which should be a solution to previous failures. To answer 
my research question, ‘Why does the international community not intervene in the humanitarian 
crisis in Syria?’, I will use three IR theories to find out why this framework failed in the case of Syria. 
Although this thesis has its focus on the case of Syria, I hope to find out which factors are leading to 
the decision of non-intervention in general. 
 
Case selection 
This thesis has arose from my own curiosity about why the international community has not stopped 
the humanitarian crisis in Syria, with in mind the R2P framework which supposed to provide a 
solution to prevent that history would repeat itself. After the ‘successful’ intervention in Libya, 
which was legitimized by R2P and Resolution 1973, it seemed for a while that R2P was the answer 
to the international prayer for an intervention framework that provides the international community 
with a manner to react quick and in the right way to a humanitarian crisis. The case of Syria shows 
that the R2P framework cannot fit every case of humanitarian crisis. This is why I have chosen Syria 
as the case of study for this thesis. It shows that R2P is not the rule but the exception as a solution to 
a humanitarian crisis.  
 
Concepts and Definitions 
This thesis concentrates on the question ‘why the international community has not intervene in the 
humanitarian crisis in Syria’. Humanitarian intervention is, therefore, a central concept in this thesis. 
A lot of authors have tried to define this concept in such a way that all the aspects are being 
encapsulated. The definition of humanitarian intervention that I will use in this thesis is the definition 
by Holzgrefe (2003: 18) and states “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or 
group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental 
human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within 
whose territory force is applied, and the use of military personnel to assist the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to people in need.” I have chosen this definition because it excludes non-military 
interventions and interventions by states that have the aim to rescue their own people. It also 
excludes an intervention based on suffering from natural disasters or social injustice and inequality. 
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What the definition does includes is that the purpose of a military intervention is to rescue people 
from suffering from the inability of their own state to protect and secure their human rights. The R2P 
framework, which has the focus in this thesis, also includes the possibility and the conditions for 
military intervention in a humanitarian crisis. For that reason, I think the definition by Holzgrefe 
(2003) fits best in this thesis. 
 Following the fact that to explain the research question, the focus of this thesis is on the 
feasibility of the framework of the ICISS report of 2001: ‘The Responsibility to Protect’. R2P as a 
concept is “the idea that sovereign states have the responsibility to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are 
unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.” 
(ICISS, 2001: VIII). This idea is the central theme of the report by the ICISS of 2001.  
 To test this feasibility, I have mentioned in the theoretical framework that I will use three IR 
theories. These IR theories analyze the state system which is according to Jackson&Sørensen (2007: 
9) “the relations between politically organized human groupings which occupy distinctive territories, 
are not under any higher authority or power, and enjoy and exercise a measure of independence 
from each other.” This state system is based on sovereign states. Sovereignty has two dimensions; 
the internal dimension and the external dimension. The internal dimension implies that a state is 
sovereign when it “exercises supreme authority over the affairs and people within its territory” 
(Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 313). The external dimension implies that a state is sovereign when it “is 
recognized as such by the international community, i.e., its territorial integrity and internal 
sovereignty are respected and upheld”(Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 313). The R2P report of the ICISS 
(2001) are extending this sovereignty to a concept of responsibility. Evans&Sahnoun (2002: 102) 
argue that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility which is also related to the two dimensions of 
sovereignty. The internal responsibility that sovereignty has, is that the state has to respect and 
secure the fundamental human rights of all its people. The external responsibility is that states have 
to respect the sovereignty of other states. But if a state is not able to commit itself to its responsibility, 
the responsibility will shift to the international community. The international community in that case 
is justified to intervene with the purpose to fulfill their responsibility (ICISS, 2001).  
 
Variables  
The research question of this thesis has the ‘decision not to intervene’ as the dependent variable. 
Which factors contribute to the decision not to intervene will provide an answer to the question ‘Why 
does the international community not intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Syria?’. To narrow 
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down the focus I will analyze R2P as a framework that supposed to give an answer about how to 
react to a humanitarian crisis. In this way I use this framework as the tool that determines on what 
conditions a humanitarian intervention can be proceed, and exclude other legal conditions that can 
influence this decision, like international law. To answer my research question, I will test R2P 
through three IR theories: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These three IR theories will 
provide the independent variables which are used to underpin the answer.  
This means that for realism the variables are national security and state survival. Because 
realists presume that war is always lurking and inevitable, states must act to secure their national 
security and their survival. By national security I mean the state has the obligation to behave and act 
in such a way that it “encounters real or potential internal and external threats”(Jackson&Sørensen, 
2007: 310) and that the state ensures the safety of its people. In the case of liberalism, cooperation 
within international relations is of great importance. Humans have common interests and cooperation 
will provide progress and benefit for all. Therefore, people are willing to work together and 
overcome their fear for each other and their lust for power whereby war can be avoided. So for 
liberalism the independent variables will be common interest and cooperation. The last independent 
variable relates to constructivism. Constructivists argue that the international system is created by 
men. Their ideas and beliefs create a set of norms which evolve at a particular time, at a particular 
place, and is influenced by certain people. This social world is an intersubjective domain which has 
meaning to the people who have created it and live in it. So the independent variable which is related 
to constructivism is the set of norms within the international community.        
 
Hypotheses 
During the Arab Spring, several states have experienced the dissatisfaction of their people and have 
responded with violence against these protests. The people of Tunisia and Egypt have achieved to 
remove their incumbent state leaders and their governments without the international community to 
intervene. The people of Libya could not cope with their state leader Qaddafi and asked the 
international community to assist in removing the incumbent government. Within a month France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States formed a ‘coalition of the willing’ and intervened with 
military forces on humanitarian grounds (CNN World, 2012). This intervention fell within ’The 
Responsibility to Protect’. It was the first intervention which was covered by this framework since 
the appearance of the ICISS (2001) report.  
 Today, the atrocities in Syria keep dominating the news and the discussion within the 
international community. According to R2P, we have the responsibility as a community to intervene 
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if a state is unable or unwilling to stop the atrocities (ICISS, 2001). But if this framework should be 
the answer to humanitarian crises in this new century, why then has the international community not 
intervened with military action under the name of R2P?  
 The following hypotheses are provided to search for an answer to that question, and are 
related to the three IR theories which form the basis for the independent variables. For each variable 
related to the IR theories, I have come up with a hypothesis which can be applied to the case of Syria, 
and tests the feasibility of R2P. The first two hypotheses will relate to realism, the third will relate to 
liberalism, and the last one will relate to constructivism. 
 
 H1 If the national security of an intervening state is at risk than that state is not willing to 
 intervene. 
 
 H2 If the survival of an intervening state is in danger than that state is not willing to 
 intervene 
 
These two hypotheses are based on the core assumptions of realism and are related to each other. In 
the case of Syria, these two variables can be considered to be at stake. Syria has a central and 
important position in the Middle East which implies the possibility of negative consequences. 
According to realism, the threat of war is always lurking. It is important for states to estimate their 
chances to win. (Jackson&Sønsen, 2007). The risks for the states and the state system to intervene 
have an important influence on the decision to intervene, even when R2P states that there is a moral 
duty and responsibility to protect. 
 
“Nothing in the UN Charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders. What the 
Charter does say is that ‘armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’. But what is 
this common interest? Who shall define it? Who shall defend it? Under whose authority? And with 
what means of intervention?” (Kofi Annan, 1999).  
 
 H3 If there is no common interest prior to an intervention than parties are not willing to 
 cooperate. 
 
Above quote contains the core assumption of liberalism. The hypothesis is related to this core 
assumption. Liberalism argues that common interests will lead to cooperation though international 
institutions. This cooperation will foster progress and will make states more dependent of each other 
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and less unreliable. The Security Council of the United Nations is such an international institution 
and is authorized to intervene in the name of R2P. But this Security Council consists of fifteen 
members of which five members are permanent. These five are the great powers and have the right to 
veto. If these five members do not share the same interest in the conflict of Syria, then the decision to 
intervene will be hard to achieve.   
 
 H4 If the norms involved in humanitarian intervention are not shared by all the members 
 of the international community than the decision-making whether or not to intervene 
 will jam.  
  
The international community is based on Western liberal norms and values, but this international 
community, represented by the United Nations, does not only consist of Western states. It also 
consists of states of the Middle East, Africa, Southern America, and Asia. Russia and China are two 
of the Five Great Powers within the UN Security Council and share norms and values other than the 
Western states. Although they recognize the UN Charter and R2P, they still do not have the same 
understandings of concepts like ‘sovereignty’ or ‘humanitarian intervention’ (Achary, 2002; Weiss, 
2007). According to constructivism, this can create difficulties during the process of decision-making 
about an intervention. There must be a shared understanding of beliefs between the actors within the 
international arena. The international system does not exist on its own but is formed by ideas. These 
ideas determine the way in which actors behave. If these ideas are not shared by the whole 
international community in the same way, then actors will behave in different ways 
(Jackson&Sørensen, 2007). This means that because of the differences between the Western thought 
and the Asian thought, the decision to intervene may be blocked.   
 
Scope and Limitations  
The focus of this thesis is ‘ why the international community does not intervene in the humanitarian 
crisis is Syria’. I have based my research on the ‘failure’ of R2P and the international interests which 
are involved in the case of Syria. Because Syria is an ongoing case, I have chosen not to analyze the 
situation and not to find out at which point the international community could have or should have 
intervened. The focus is really on the ‘ why’ in this case. I have also narrow down the use of 
literature about the development of humanitarian intervention. If I would grub into the whole history 
of this controversial issue, I would deviate from the subject. That is why I used literature for the 
literature review about the development after the Cold War with the focus on the report of R2P.  In 
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case of the interests which I will show, I have selected the US because of its position as ‘hegemony’, 
Russia and China because of their veto against a possible intervention in Syria, and Iran because of 
its position in the Middle East and its support to the Assad regime. 
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Chapter 3 
The set of interests involved in the case of Syria 
 
Syria has an important central position in the Middle East. It is because of this strategic position that 
the interests are highly complicated now that the humanitarian crisis calls for action. For this chapter 
I have chosen four states, who are important for the outcome of this situation. 
 
The United States 
After the fall of Mubarak’s Egypt, the United States were afraid that their ally Israel would come into 
isolation and would be the target of the Middle East. Mubarak stood aside the conflict for years and 
was even criticized by the Cairo Anti-War Conference for the lack of action against Israel. Egypt 
played an important role in the region for the stability of Israel. Iran, which is outspoken about its 
fight against Israel and the infidel West, plays an important role in the crisis of Syria. It assists the 
Assad regime with intelligence and military help, and supplies the Syrian government with weapons. 
If the crisis continues, the fear for spill-over is high which can lead to overall chaos in the Middle 
East, this fear raise questions about the security of Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, and Jordan. The 
position of the United States and Israel will become at risk. Therefore the interest of the US is a 
democratic transition of the Assad regime. This will ensure Israel’s safety and US’s position in the 
region. An escalation of the conflict will cause new pressures on the minority groups within Syria 
and outside if the fight leads to a regional conflict. Furthermore, the US perspective of the Syrian 
regime is that is a sponsor of terrorism. For years Syria has supported Hizbullah and Palestinian 
groups. In their war against terrorism, this is a US national interest. The crisis creates a playground 
for extremist groups like Al Qaeda. Another fear the US has is the possession of weapons of mass 
destruction by the Assad regime and Iran which can have effects for the regional security. But to go 
to war against Syria is probably not an option for the US. The wars against Iraq and Afghanistan 
have brought heavy costs on the US, not only financial but also in lives. Their attempts for solutions 
have been failed by the unwillingness of third parties (Sharp&Blanchard, 20012). 
 
China 
For China, state sovereignty is a sacred principle. The People’s Republic of China is strongly against 
arbitrary or excessive interference from the outside. Interventions with the use of armed forces are 
especially rejected. China has uses their right to veto to block decisions considering interventions, 
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especially when these interventions are led by the US and the West. China is concerned that these 
types of intervention are used to satisfy the national interest of the intervening states, and have often 
as a purpose to change the incumbent regime. One day, they think, it could happen to Beijing. 
Ambassador Wang Min argues that their point of view is “to safeguard the purposes and principles 
of the UN Charter as well as the basic norms governing international relations, including the 
principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in others’ internal affairs, to safeguard the 
interests of the Syrian people and the Arab states, and to safeguard the interests of all countries, 
small and medium-sized in particular. This is China’s consistent stance in all international affairs. It 
is not targeted at a particular issue or time.”  
 Although China has accepted R2P as a norm within the international community, they have 
learned their lesson when this norm was applied in the case of Libya, with Resolution 1973. 
According to the PRC regime, the US and the NATO have misused their authorized mission to 
proceed a much wider mission which resulted in the overthrow of the Libyan government. Next to 
this lies the fact that China does not want to come stand at odds with the Arab League and the 
African Union. With members of both of the organizations, China has important political and 
economic ties. Furthermore, China does not have any economic or direct humanitarian interest in de 
case of Syria, like it did in de case of Libya. So the national interest of China is “to prevent the 
establishment of legal or procedural precedents for military interventions by the international 
community against sovereign states, except under extremely rare and narrow circumstances” 
(Swaine, 2012: 9). By saying this, China links back to the previous misuse of the UN and its norms 
by the US and the West in the case of Libya. What the statement also suggest is that the PRC regime 
wants to prevent that western states will try to interfere in non-democratic states like China.  
 
Russia 
For Russia, the Middle East is a conflict of interests. At the beginning of his function as the President 
of Russia, Putin has built multiple ties in the Middle East. His goal has been to strengthen Russia’s 
position in the Middle East. He pursued economic ties with almost every state in the region. His 
friendly relationship with the anti-American rogue states and movements, Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and 
the Hamas, and with the Sunni states, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emerates in 
the Middle East have brought difficulties in satisfying all parties. Now, with the crisis in Syria asking 
for a solution, Russia finds itself in the middle of conflicting interests. The spillover of the violence 
can have the consequences of total chaos in the Middle East. Russia, who has stabilized its position 
in the region does not want to risk its economic interests with the Sunni states. But his other concern 
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is the friendly relationship with the anti-American rogue states, who have the same interest of 
reducing US’s position in the region. Russia’s desire to become once again a ‘great power’, will 
become more realistic if the position of the US is reduced in the Middle East. Furthermore, Russia 
want to remain the friendly ties with Iran. If Iran becomes the leading power in the Middle East, with 
the possession of nuclear weapons, Russia must insure itself and its position in the region by keeping 
close ties to Iran. Also Syria has been of great importance in securing Russia’s stabilized position in 
the Middle East. If Syria would break down, can Russia still be sure of that position and would its 
economic interests in the region still be safe (Freedman, 2012). 
 Another concern of Russia is the way in which R2P has been used by the US to interfere in 
Libya. While Russia and China resorted in abstention, the US used the authorized Resolution 1973 to 
proceed an intervention in Libya. This incident have led to distrust the intentions of the US and the 
West with regards to the use of R2P. Putin, with the accusation of having the same kind of regime as 
the Assad regime, can be afraid that R2P will reach beyond the responsibility to protect and be used 
by the West to interfere in every state that shares a different perspective of how to govern a state 
(Stepanova, 2012).  
 
Iran 
For Iran, the confrontation in Syria is of great importance in its fight against the West. How the 
situation in Syria will develop and who will comes out on top as the winner at the end of the crisis is 
crucial in the reshaping of the Middle East, because of Syria’s central strategic position in this region. 
After the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, Iran and the West faced 
against each other in Lebanon. Since that particular confrontation, Iran saw Lebanon as the first line 
of confrontation with the West. The crisis in Syria gives a good opportunity to show the West and 
the ‘moderate’ Arab states that Iran is the new emerging power who must be taken seriously as a 
power that influence the process in the Middle East. With their nuclear program, Iran has something 
to come up with during negotiations with the West. Iran assumes that the possession of nuclear 
weapons will achieve the status of the uprising power in the region and will push the West out of the 
Middle East. Such a weapon will give Iran immunity and a more strategic position to influence the 
region. With Syria in their hands, Palestine at one site, and the loyalty of Hizbullah in Lebanon, Iran 
will have a strong strategic position (Segall, 2012).  
 Iran justifies their involvement by arguing that with the assistance of the West, regional states 
led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar are supporting Syrian rebels. Iran cannot sit back and see how their 
longstanding ally is threated by these external forces. A deputy commander of the Revolutionary 
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Guards Corp – Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Esmail Ghani, argues Iran’s involvement by saying that “is 
aimed at preventing a massacre of people…Before we came to Syria, there was a large massacre of 
the citizens by the opposition, but with the physical and material presence of Iran, a further 
massacre in Syria was prevented” (Segall, 2012:4). This IRGC-QF is known for their special 
subversion and terror missions outside of Iran, and has been operating in Syria for a long time being 
responsible for assisting Assad with the repression of demonstrations and providing Hizbullah with 
logistical, intelligence, and military help. Another justification which Iran uses for their involvement 
is their ideological motive. According to Imam Khomeini has Allah ordered Muslims to defend each 
other against external threats. No infidel can rule over Muslims. With this reason, Iran also justifies 
their support to the Palestinians, who are ‘repressed’ by Israel and unacknowledged by the West, 
according to Iran.    
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Chapter 4  
The failure of R2P through the eyes of the IR theories 
 
The report, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ by the ICISS,  is a reaction on the call by the United Nations 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan to find a solution on how to react “to gross and systematic violations 
of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” (ICISS, 2001: VII). ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect’ report deals with the question of the appropriateness of a humanitarian 
intervention, in particular with the use of military forces.  
Gareth Evans, an Australian politician with several International position,  and Mohamed 
Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat who has a long history in national and international diplomacy,  had 
the honor to be the Co-Chairs of the ICISS. In their report they mention the diversity of the Internal 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: Gisèle Côté-Harper, a Canadian lawyer and 
professor which is specialized in criminal law and human rights; Lee Hamilton, an American 
politician who have chaired many committees like the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and U.S. 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Micheal Ignatieff, a Canadian author, academic 
and former politician who served as the director of the Care Center for Human Rights Policy at 
Harvard University; Vladimir Lukin, a Russian liberal political activist who served as the Human 
Right Commissioner; Klaus Naumann, a retired German General who was the Chairman of the 
NATO Military Committee; Cyril Ramaphosa, a South African politician, business man, and activist 
who has been chosen as chief mediator in the Kenyan crisis; Fidel Ramos, former President of the 
Philippines; Cornelio Sommaruga, a Swiss humanitarian, lawyer, and diplomat who was the 
President of the International Committee of the Red Cross; Eduardo Stein, a Guatemalan diplomat 
who had held position in the International Organization for Migration, and the United Nations 
Development Programme; and Ramesh Thakur, a political scientist and peace searcher who had the 
position as head of the Peace Research Centre of the Australian National University. This group of 
twelve Commissioners have hold series of discussions in Beijing, Cairo, Geneva, London, Maputo, 
New Delhi, New York, Ottawa, Paris, St Petersburg, Santiago, and Washington, and were also being 
advised by several influential people on the issue of humanitarian intervention, like Thomas Weiss 
(ICISS, 2001, III-IX). This report sets the goal to generate a new international consensus to the 
issues about the responsibility to protect. Evans and Sahnoun (ICISS, 2001, VIII) note that the R2P 
report has found consensus within the Commission and reflects all shared views of the 
Commissioners “to what is politically achievable in the world as we know it today”. If the 
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international community does not want more Rwandas then, they argue, they belief that adapting the 
proposals, which the report mentions, is “the best way of insuring that” (ICISS, 2001, VIII).   
The ICISS Report (2001) provides these proposals in a framework which is based on  two 
main principles: ‘the core principles’ and ‘the principles for military intervention’. These two main 
principles set the guidelines that a case must meet if it is eligible for a humanitarian intervention. 
Each of the main principles is built up from several guidelines. ‘The core principles’ are setting the 
basic guidelines for the international community about the respect towards sovereignty and their 
responsibility as an international community. These ‘core principles’ are divided into four 
categories’. The first category provides the ‘basic principles’. These principles outline the 
responsibility that is invoked with sovereignty. The second category of the ‘core principles’ provides  
the ‘foundations’. These foundations outline the basis of the responsibility and the obligation of the 
international community. The ‘elements’ which outline the three specific responsibilities of the 
international community - to prevent, to react, and to rebuild – is set in the third category. The forth 
and last category of the ‘core principles’ provides the ‘priorities’. This category outlines what is the 
most important dimension of the R2P, namely to prevent (ICISS, 2001: XI).  
The ‘principles for military intervention’ states the guidelines for a casus to meet before the 
international community can intervene with military forces. These ‘principles for military 
intervention’ are also divided into four categories. The ‘just cause threshold’ which outlines the kind 
of harm that must occur before the international community is justified to intervene with military 
forces, is the first category. The second one is ‘the precautionary principles’. These principles outline 
the measures that have to be taken before an intervention, and can also form a sort of justification for 
the intervention. The third category is that of the ‘right authority’, which implies that the authority to 
decide when and how to intervene is the Security Council of the United Nations, and also which 
procedure the Security Council has to follow in their decision making. The last of the ‘principles for 
military intervention’ is the category ‘operational principles’. These principles outline the procedure 
that has to be followed when military forces are involved (ICISS, 2001: XII-XIII). The actual R2P 
framework as formulated in the ICISS report of 2001 can be found in the appendix (I) of this thesis.  
As mentioned above, the Commissioners have reached a consensus about the Report and its 
framework. But you can ask yourself  if twelve people can provide an intervention framework, based 
on the thought of responsibility, in which the whole world can find themselves. The United Nations 
(UN), who represents the international community, counts 193 member states in 2011, the year in 
which the Syrian crisis started. An amount of 193 members, brings an amount of 193 interests, 
voices, and perspectives. Especially, the Five Permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council, 
who have the right to veto, can interrupt or sabotage the decision-making process. To avoid this 
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problem, the report of R2P calls on the P-5 members not to use their veto when their national 
interests are not involved but to ‘resort in abstention’. It is unrealistic to think this will actually 
happen. The veto of Russia and China are clear examples of the fact that states do not follow a call 
that has been done by the UN if their national interest will not be maximized by their action.  
According to the realist view within international relations, states always strive for what is best for 
their national interest (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007: 70). Morgenthau (1965) mentions in one of his 
principles that because human nature is self-interested in maximizing their security and survival, 
these interests will come in conflict within the international arena of politics. Realists do not believe 
in some sort of high authority that functions as a world government, states will always struggle for 
domination. When they are dominant to others they do not have to fear for their national security and 
state survival (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007). In this sense, it is logical that the P-5 members do use their 
veto if they have no interest in an intervention. In the case of a veto, non-intervention is the best 
option that serves their national interests. Both Russia and China have experienced the time that they 
resorted in abstention, as negative. During the endorsement of Resolution 1973, both states resorted 
in abstention, which led to an intervention in Libya. Russia and China see this as the prove that R2P 
can serve as a tool to satisfy a hidden agenda of the intervening states. This also proves the fact that 
the national interest of a state will come into conflict when it blends in the international arena of 
politics. 
The liberal view within international relations is more positive about the relations between 
states. Liberals recognize the self-interests of humans but they argue that humans are aware of the 
fact that cooperation leads to greater benefits for all. If there is a common interest, people are willing 
to cooperate in domestic affairs as well as international affairs (Jackson&Sørensen, 2007:97). The 
report on R2P assumes that the common responsibility to protect will be the common interest for all 
Security Council members. In the case of Syria this is obviously not the case, and the positive view 
of liberalism can turn against itself. Three explanations can be derived from the liberal perspective, 
why R2P does not fit the case of Syria. The first one is based on the argument of social liberalists 
Keohane and Nye (1977), who argue that after the Cold War the interdependence relationship 
between states have changed. The relation is not merely between the state leaders but developed 
more between different levels of actors, like economics and banks. According to Keohane and Nye 
(1977), it is this change in relationship that makes the use of military force less effective. In the case 
of Syria there is a reasonable fear that the use of military force will escalate the conflict, which will 
lead to a spillover. The Middle East is an important region for the import of oil, and other economic 
interests. If the region turns in a complete conflict, the financial consequences for the West will be 
high. The second explanation derives from the ideas of the structural liberalists Deudney and 
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Ikenberry (1999). In their description of the relations between Western liberal democracies, they 
describe five principles which are the principles of the Western order. In short these principles show 
us how the Western society deals with each other. The West has locked one another into mutually 
constraining institutions like the UN. It is the United Stated who has been the leading force but is 
susceptible to pressure of its allies. Next to the hegemony of the United States, are partial great 
powers. Here plays their possession of nuclear weapons an important part in for their position. The 
West operates with economic openness. They believe that only through openness the optimal results 
can be achieved. Furthermore, the West shares the same political values and civil liberties. These 
principles show how dependent the Western countries are of each other. But as we have seen, the 
international community does no longer consists of Western countries. Not only Germany and Japan 
have the access to nuclear power. The technique to make nuclear weapons have reach states like Iran 
and North Korea. These states share in no way any western values at all. In the case of Syria, Iran 
plays an important role. It is an upcoming power in the Middle East and wants to reduce the 
influence of the US and the West in the region. Iran already has expressed its loyalty to Syria and 
that it is not afraid to use all means if it has to protect the Syrian regime. It is also the 
interdependence of the states that constrain the possibility to intervene in Syria. Syria is a melting pot 
of interests, as we have seen in the previous chapter, all states have to protect their position in the 
Middle East. The third explanation is based on the ideas of sociological liberalist Rosenau (1992), 
who argues that states have no overlapping interests. It are the individuals who have overlapping 
interests. Transnational networks should bring more peace to the world but it are these transnational 
networks which are so threatening in the case of Syria. Syria, with a central strategic position in the 
Middle East, attracts radical extremists groups to blend in the violence, and if Syria would break 
down there is a possibility that these groups will fill up the political vacuum. R2P consists a clause 
which states that “there must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering 
which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the 
consequences of inaction” (ICISS, 2002: XII).  This clause can be criticized due the fact that it is 
difficult to know in advance what the results will be or how many lives will be saved by the decision 
to intervene. Taylor Seybolt (2007: 4) argues that this ‘reasonable chance of success’ can be 
achieved if the intervening states have the political will to intervene and if they know what to expect. 
Humanitarian interventions are high-risk operations with a high price tag. If the operation fails it has 
wasted lives and resources. More dangerous is the possible consequence that the situation 
deteriorates and will feed war. According to Seybolt (2007) and Weiss (2007) timing is the key. 
“The longer the delay, the more people will die.” (Seybolt, 2007: 22). Weiss (2007: 104) criticizes 
the clause of ‘last resort’ by saying that “by the time that all the alternatives to military force have 
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been explored, many of the people whom humanitarian intervention is intended to save could be 
dead or have fled.” Stanley Hoffman (1997: 39) goes further by arguing that in the time that is been 
wasted on waiting, the level and intensity of force that is used to do the job, will increase. In the case 
of Syria, again, the international community is, according to these critics,  late in coming which 
makes the possibility that action will take place less likely. The fear of an escalating war will reduce 
the political will. 
This brings us back to the fact of the lacking political will to intervene in the humanitarian 
crisis in Syria. According to the constructivists in international relations, the international system is 
not a given but depends on the thoughts and ideas of people who are involved in it. The international 
community is formed by ideas and beliefs which create a set of norms. The shared understanding of 
these norms by different actors, is what gives the international community their meaning 
(Jackson&Sørensen: 169). Martha Finnemore (1996) argues that the development of state identity 
and its interest works as a cycle. The behavior of a state is determined by the identity and the 
interests of a state, which in turn are defined by international forces. Through international 
organizations, like the UN, these forces, which are the norms of behavior accepted within the 
international community, find passage to transmit these norms to states. These norms create national 
policy, which gives meaning to the identity and interests of a state.  Both, Finnemore (1996) and 
Wendt (1992) emphasizes that the international environment is  the most important factor that shapes  
the identity of a state. This idea can explain the differences between for example the Western thought 
and the Asian thought. Because of their history, Asia is suspicious about the idea of intervention. 
Foreign minister of Malaysia, Syed Hamid Albar, showed the Asian thought with the following 
words: “We have to be wary all the time of new concepts and new philosophies that will compromise 
sovereignty in the name of humanitarian intervention, in the name of globalization which is another 
form of trying to interfere in the domestic affairs of another country.” (AFP, 1999). The concept of 
R2P received a hostile response in Asia (Acharya, 2002: 377). That region of the world is not 
convinced by the fact that R2P can change contemporary reality of  the little influence that the 
developing countries have in the UN Security Council with regard to the decision-making process 
involved humanitarian intervention. Their perspective of humanitarian intervention is that it is still 
the privilege of the great powers over the weak. The report tries to persuade states that are suspicious 
towards interventions based on humanitarian grounds, by formulating the ‘core principles’ of the 
framework in a way that makes the ‘principles for military action’ acceptable. In this way they hoped 
for China and Russia not to use their veto in the decision-making process(Weiss, 2007: 100). 
Unfortunately, the international community have already experienced a veto of these two states in 
the process towards an intervention in Syria. An explanation for the lack of consensus about R2P can 
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be found in the ‘Norm Lifecycle Model’ of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), according to Shawki 
(2011) and Tardy (2012). Shawki (2011) argues that the concept of R2P in the report of ICISS differs 
from the norm that has been endorsed by the Word Summit in 2005. This leads to confusion about 
the interpretation of R2P in the future. Next to this, Tardy (2012) argues that because of the linking 
concepts of R2P and the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations, the acceptance of R2P as 
a norm would be a slow process. The link to the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations 
lies in the concept of the ‘responsibility to rebuild’. This principle can be used by great powers to 
impose their ideology and values on the future government of a state. The fear for the misuse of the 
norm by the great powers in order to safeguard their national interest, will lead to no consensus about 
R2P.     
So this analysis of R2P through the eyes of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, shows us 
that R2P has a long way to go when it wants to fulfill its task as the new international norm which 
should have brought consensus about the idea of humanitarian intervention.    
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has been written with the aim to get more understanding of the reasons why the 
international community did not intervened in the humanitarian crisis in Syria which has been going 
on for about more than two years now. With the establishment of ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, its 
endorsement at the World Summit in 2005, and its debut in Libya, one would have expected some 
kind of intervention in the Syrian situation. But this thesis have shown the opposite.  
 Related to the aim of this thesis, the research question is ‘Why does the international 
community not intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Syria?’. In the light of the expectations of R2P, 
I have used three IR theories to test the feasibility of the framework. My main argument in this thesis 
is that because of the non-consensus within the international community about R2P as a norm, there 
is a lack of political will to intervene in the situation in Syria. Furthermore, I argue that this lack of 
consensus is caused by the protection of the national interests of the states involved, especially the 
security of their sovereignty.  
 To underpin my arguments, I have formulated four hypotheses which are based on the 
assumptions of the three IR theories outlined in the theoretical framework of this thesis. The first two 
hypotheses are related to each other and form the core assumption of realism. The first focuses on the 
national security of a state: H1 If the national security of an intervening state is at risk than that state 
is not willing to intervene. The second one focuses on state survival: H2 If the survival of an 
intervening state is in danger than that state is not willing to intervene. Chapter 3 of this thesis 
describes the set of interests which is involved in the case of Syria. The cases of the states involved 
show that the most important national interest is their state sovereignty. Scholars like Fixdal and 
Smith (1998), and Evans and Sahnoun (2002) argue that the old debate about humanitarian 
intervention, which focused on sovereignty and motive, has been replaced by a new debate, which 
focus on responsibility and the proper use of force. This thesis shows that, although the debate about 
humanitarian intervention has two new concepts to discuss, the issues of the old debate are not by far 
resolved. States, other than Western states, are suspicious about the motives behind the use of R2P, 
and afraid that R2P will become an instrument to interfere in states that share no Western values. 
This implies that both the state security, as well as, the state survival are at risk for those who agree 
with the implementation of R2P.  Russia and China have experienced that the assent of Resolution 
1973 resulted in an intervention in Libya. From this point of view, their distrust is substantiated. 
With this knowledge I will adopt both these two hypotheses. 
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 The third hypothesis which underpins my main argument is based on the core assumption of 
liberalism and focuses on common interest and cooperation within the international community:  
H3 If there is no common interest prior to an intervention than parties are not willing to cooperate. 
The report on R2P assumes that R2P has been accepted as a norm within the international 
community, and that R2P is thus the common interest of the international community. This thesis 
shows differently. The arguments of liberalism about common interests, interdependence, and 
transnational networks work against each other in the case of Syria. We have seen that there is no 
common interest with regard to R2P. States put their national interest of protecting their sovereignty 
above the duty to protect people who are in a humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, the interdependence 
makes the case more difficult. As Keohane and Nye (1977) already argue, is that interdependence 
makes the use of military action less effective. Armed forces would probably cause an escalation of 
the conflict in Syria and risk the change of a spillover to other states in the region. This escalation 
and spillover would endanger the interests of states which have economic ties in the region. Next to 
this fact is the danger of transnational networks. Radical extremists have blended in the conflict. 
Their presence have increased the complexity and the risk to intervene. Due to these circumstances, 
the political will to intervene has been minimalized. So the third hypothesis can also be accepted in 
the case of Syria.  
 The final hypothesis of this research is based on the core assumption of constructivism. The 
focus here is on the norms of humanitarian intervention shared by the international community:  
H4 If the norms involved in humanitarian intervention are not shared by all the members of the 
international community than the decision-making process will jam. This thesis have shown that, 
although the ICISS states that there is an overall consensus by the members of the Commission, and 
R2P is endorsed during the World Summit in 2005, there is in no way any sign of an overall 
consensus. According to Shawki (2011) and Tardy (2012), the norm is still at the refining stage. The 
concept of ‘sovereignty’ is still considered as a principle to which no exception is acceptable. This 
explains why the R2P cannot be applied unambiguously.  
 This brings me back to the quote I have used at the beginning of this thesis. Evans and 
Sahnoun (2002: 100) have said that “It is only a matter of time before reports emerge again from 
somewhere of massacres, mass starvation, rape, and ethnic cleansing. And then the question will 
arise again in the Security Council, in political capitals, and in the media: ‘What do we do?’ This 
time around the international community must have the answers. The report by the ICISS (2001) on 
‘The responsibility to Protect’ has created the expectation to be that answer. Acharya (2002: 373) 
even argued that R2P must deserves the attention of everyone that is interested in “promoting 
multilateral approaches to global peace”. But it seems that Weiss (2007: 109) has been right by 
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arguing that the report has not changed a lot in finding the solution how to act in humanitarian crises. 
The controversy of humanitarian intervention will remain the same as it did before the establishment 
of R2P. States with the political will and capacity will still intervene, under which circumstances that 
may be. This can be said the other way around. If states lack the political will and capacity to stand 
up against the violence then they will not intervene, even if the circumstances are calling for it. 
Weiss (2007: 110) also argues that there is “a lack of institutional adjustment”. This thesis has 
shown that the international community represented by the UN, does still struggle with all the 
different norms an values, and interests and power position of their members. But it requires a whole 
different thesis to go into this institutional shortcoming of the UN Security Council.  
 So regarding to my research question I will close by arguing that the international community 
is still too divided on the norm of intervention. The main priority of a state is to protect their national 
interest, in particular their state sovereignty. The report on R2P considers sovereignty as a dual 
responsibility, but in particular the authoritarian states are concerned that R2P will become an 
instrument for the ‘great’ Western power to interfere in their domestic affairs. Because of this 
division there will not be an overall consensus about R2P as the new international norm in the near 
future. Furthermore, because of this lack of consensus there will be no political will to intervene in 
Syria. The national interests of the states involved are too much at stake if they agree on an 
intervention based on R2P. As Fixdal and Smith (1998: 284) argue, “humanitarian intervention is 
never purely humanitarian”. R2P has a long way to go before it will be taken for granted by the 
international community.  In the meanwhile, R2P will be the exception instead of the rule.  
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Appendix I  
‘The Responsibility to Protect’ framework (ICISS, 2001) 
 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
CORE PRINCIPLES 
(1) BASIC PRINCIPLES  
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its    people lies 
with the state itself. 
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, 
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
internal responsibility to protect. 
 
(2) FOUNDATIONS 
The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community of states, lie in: 
A. obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty; 
B. the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of 
international peace and security; 
C. specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and  treaties, 
international humanitarian law and national law; 
D. the developing practices of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself. 
 
(3) ELEMENTS 
The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities: 
A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other 
man-made crises putting populations at risk. 
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, 
which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases 
military intervention.  
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with 
recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to 
halt or avert. 
 
(4) PRIORITIES 
A. Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options 
should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be 
devoted to it. 
B. The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should always involve less intrusive and coercive 
measures being considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.  
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THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
PRINCIPLES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION 
 
(1) THE JUST CAUSE THRESHOLD 
Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there 
must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind:  
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of 
deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or 
B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of 
terror or rape.  
 
(2) THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLES 
A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, 
must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly 
supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned. 
B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or 
peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would 
not have succeeded.  
C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the 
minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective. 
D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which 
has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of 
inaction. 
 
(3) RIGHT AUTHORITY 
A. There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military 
intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a 
source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has. 
B. Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being 
carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request such authorization, or have the Council 
raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter. 
C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are 
allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate 
verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention. 
D.  The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters 
where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military 
intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support. 
E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options are: 
I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the “ Uniting 
for Peace” procedure; and 
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II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the 
Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council. 
F. The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to discharge its   
responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule 
out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation – and that stature and and credibility of the 
United Nations may suffer thereby. 
 
(4) OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES 
A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match. 
B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal 
communications and chain of command.  
C. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being 
protection of a population, not defeat of a state. 
D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and 
involve total adherence to international humanitarian law. 
E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principle objective. 
F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations. 
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